Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economic behaviors. In this paper, a method is developed to evaluate ESS in symmetric two-person games with fuzzy payoffs. Every strategy is assigned a membership that describes to what extent it is an ESS. The fuzzy set of ESS can characterize the nature of ESS, and also gives a ranking of the stablest strategies. This method uses the satisfaction function to compare fuzzy payoffs, and adopts the fuzzy decision rule to obtain the membership function of the fuzzy ESS set. The relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy Nash equilibrium is also explored. In a symmetric two-person game, the fuzzy ESS set is a subset of the fuzzy symmetric Nash equilibrium set. The numeric results are congruous as expected, therefore this method to evaluate and compare ESSs is appropriate for fuzzy payoff games.
Introduction
A game is a decision-making system that involves more than one decision maker. Game theory is the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision makers [1] . Game theory has been successfully applied to a wide range of subjects including economics, biology, political science, computer science and so on. In real-world games, it is often difficult to evaluate the preferences of the players and the outcomes of different strategy profiles precisely because of inaccuracy of information and fuzzy understanding of situations.
Fuzzy set theory [2] provides an excellent tool to model uncertainty, by assigning a membership to each element of a set. The membership describes the degree to which an element possesses the defining characteristics of that set.
A game has four main components: a set of players, a set of strategies for each player, a set of payoffs, and preference relation. Defining each of these components as a fuzzy one would lead to a fuzzy game. Many results on fuzzy game theory have been reported in the literature. The readers can refer to a survey [3] for the advances of the theory of fuzzy games.
In traditional game theory there is a well developed mathematical formalism to study the evolutionary dynamics of a population consisting of interacting individuals [4] . In evolutionary game theory, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) defined by Maynard Smith and Price [5] is a key concept describing the stable states of a population resulting from dynamics of evolution. They considered a population in which individuals are matched randomly in pairs to play a symmetric two-person game. Initially all individuals play the same incumbent strategy, then a small population share of individuals who play some other mutant strategy is injected. The incumbent strategy is said to be an ESS, if for each mutant strategy, there exists a positive invasion barrier such that if the population share of mutants falls below this barrier, the incumbents earns a higher expected payoff than the mutants. Consequently incumbents have no incentive to change their strategy, and the mutants have an incentive to return to the incumbent strategy. An ESS may be thought of as a convention.
In this paper, a method is proposed to evaluate ESS in symmetric two-person games with fuzzy payoffs. Instead of answering whether a strategy is an ESS or not, every strategy is assigned a membership that describes the degree to which it possess the characteristics of ESS. The strategies can be ranked according to their membership. The idea of fuzzy ESS captures the nature of ESS in a fuzzy payoff game, and can be considered as a refinement of fuzzy Nash equilibrium [6] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first reviews the concepts of symmetric two-person game and ESS, then proposes the method to produce the fuzzy ESS set, next reveals the relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy Nash equilibrium. Section 3 gives numeric results of the method. A discussion and conclusion part follows in Section 4.
Evaluation of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

Symmetric Two-person Game
A strategic game G 1 can be defined by
where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes a set of n players, S i denotes a set of strategies available to the ith player, while S 1 × S 2 × . . . × S n denotes the set of strategy combinations. The payoff function of the ith player is denoted as $ i : × j∈N S j → R. That is, after all the players have chosen their strategies from their own strategy sets, the combination of the chosen strategies determines the outcome of the game, which is represented by the payoff to each player. In economics the payoffs are usually firms' profits or consumers' utilities, while in biology payoffs usually represent individual fitness. For a symmetric two-person game, N = {1, 2}, and the two players have the same strategy set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s |S| }, namely S 1 = S 2 = S, where |S| denotes the cardinality of S. For any i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|}, the payoff of Player 1 when he plays s i and Player 2 plays s j is the same as the payoff of Player 2 when he plays s i and Player 1 plays s j , namely $ 1 (s i , s j ) = $ 2 (s j , s i ). Hence the payoffs of the both players can be described using the same function $ = $ 1 . If Player 1 plays s i and Player 2 plays s j , the payoffs are $(s i , s j ) to Player 1 and $(s j , s i ) to Player 2. Thus a symmetric two-person game G 2 can be defined by
$ is usually expressed in the form of a |S| × |S| payoff matrix. In the remainder of this paper, the index of a strategy is often used to represent the strategy. For instance, $(i, j) is the abbreviation of $(s i , s j ).
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Definition 1 [4] : For a symmetric two-person game G 2 , a strategy s i ∈ S is an ESS if for every j = i, there exists ε ij ∈ (0, 1) such that
holds when ε ∈ (0, ε ij ). To interpret Eq. (3), suppose that a population of individuals that plays strategy s i , is invaded by a group of mutants that play the alternative strategy s j . Eq. (3) requires that regardless of the choice of s j , an incumbent's expected payoff from a random match in the post-entry population exceeds that of a mutant so long as the size of the invading group ε is smaller than the invasion barrier ε ij . A lower invasion barrier means that the population is more vulnerable to invasion, while a higher invasion barrier means that the population is stabler. For instance, the Prisoner's Dilemma game is a well-known symmetric 2 × 2 game, illustrating the conflict between individual rationality and social optimality. For this game, S = {C, D}, where C denotes "Cooperate" and D denotes "Defect". The payoffs satisfy
. According to definition 1, strategy D is an ESS, thus a player will always be tempted to defect against cooperation.
Fuzzy Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
A symmetric two-person game with fuzzy payoffs is similar to G 2 except that the values of the payoff function are fuzzy numbers, thus it can be defined by
The usage of the tilde over a symbol denotes a fuzzy number.
The fuzzy ESS set for G 3 can be obtained in the following steps:
Step 1. By substituting$ for $ in Eq. (3), the expected payoff of an incumbent isẼ
and the expected payoff of a mutant is
The multiplication and addition involving fuzzy numbers are done using the extension principle [2] :
where A, B are fuzzy numbers, λ ∈ R − {0}.
Step 2. In order to compare fuzzy numbersẼ
, the satisfaction function [7] is employed. The satisfaction function for the comparison of fuzzy values A and B is defined as
where the operator ⊙ is selected from T-norm operators, e.g., minimum operator or multiplication operator. SF (A > B) represents the possibility that A is larger than B, while SF (A < B) represents the possibility that A is smaller than B. It's obvious that SF (A > B) + SF (A < B) = 1, SF (A > A) = 0.5. Although some restrictions on A, B are necessary [7] , most types of fuzzy sets used in application, such as triangular and trapezoidal, satisfy the restrictions. The following function represents the satisfaction degree to which Eq. (3) is satisfied:
By applying Bellman and Zadeh's fuzzy decision rule [8] , for any pair of strategies (s i , s j ), the degree of resistibility of s i against s j is defined as the supremum of the intersection of µ ij and the invasion barrierε
Step 3. Finally, the fuzzy ESS setS can be defined as
The membership function value µS(i) describes the degree to which the strategy s i possesses the characteristic of ESS. The strategies can be ranked according to their membership. Strategies with a higher membership are evolutionarily stronger than those with a lower membership.
Relation between Fuzzy ESS and Fuzzy NE
The concept of Nash equilibrium [1] is a cornerstone of non-cooperative game theory. A strategy combination is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player can do better by unilaterally changing his strategy, in other words, every player is doing the best response to what the other players are doing. Definition 2 [1] : For a n-player game G 1 , a strategy combination (
holds. For instance, (D, D) is the unique NE in Prisoner's Dilemma game, and is also called a symmetric NE because of the symmetry of the strategy pair. Ref. [6] reports a recent work on finding degree of being Nash equilibrium (NE) of each strategy combination in fuzzy payoff games. Each strategy combination (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) has a possibility of being NE with the degree
Although ESS and NE were proposed in quite different settings, there is a relation between ESS and symmetric NE in symmetric two-person games. That is, the symmetric NE set contains the ESS set [4] . It happens that there is a similar relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy symmetric NE.
Theorem: In a symmetric two-person game G 2 , the fuzzy symmetric NE set contains the fuzzy ESS set, that is, for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |S|},
Proof: According to Eq. (15), According to Eq. (11,12,13),
Thus
Therefore the concept of fuzzy ESS proposed in this paper can be considered as a refinement of the concept of fuzzy NE proposed in Ref. [6] .
Numeric Results
Ref. [6] used a two-person 3 × 3 bimatrix game with fuzzy payoffs to illustrate the evaluation of fuzzy Nash equilibrium. The row player's payoffs of that game are collected in Table 1 , and will be taken as the first example of a symmetric two-person game. The column player's payoffs are collected in Table 2 , and will be taken as the second example. For instance, the payoff of a player when he plays s 1 and his rival plays s 2 is$(1, 2) = T (6, 1) in the first example. T (a, b) denotes a symmetric triangular fuzzy number. Fig. 1 shows the membership function of T (a, b). Multiplication and addition involving symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers using the extension principle are considerably simplified. Let T (a, b) and T (a ′ , b ′ ) be two symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers, c be a positive real number, then
Hence the expected payoffsẼ ij I (ε) andẼ ij M (ε) in Eq. (5) and (6) are also symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers. The multiplication operator is selected as ⊙ in the numeric examples. Table 2 : Payoff matrix of the second examplẽ
In the first example, the degree of resistibility of the strategies against alternative strategies are 
The method produces the fuzzy ESS set S = 0.397
According to their membership, the strategies can be ranked as follows:
Consider the situation in which a population that play strategy s 1 is invaded by a group of mutants that play s 2 . As can be seen in Fig. 2 , the left boundary of$ (1, 1) is not smaller than the right boundary of$(2, 1), and the left boundary of$ (1, 2) is not smaller than the right boundary of$(2, 2). According to Eq. (20, 21), the left boundary of (1 − ε) ·$(1, 1) + ε ·$(1, 2) is not smaller than the right boundary of (1 − ε) ·$(2, 1) + ε ·$(2, 2). That is,
Similarly,
This explains the values of r 12 and r 21 . 
The method produces the fuzzy ESS set
According to their membership, the strategies can be ranked as follows: Table 3 summarizes the fuzzy ESS sets and the fuzzy symmetric NE sets of these two games. For instance, µ N ash (s 1 , s 1 ) = 0.958, µ N ash (s 2 , s 2 ) = 0, µ N ash (s 3 , s 3 ) = 0.989 in the first example. It can be seen that a strategy with a high degree of being an ESS also has a high degree of being a symmetric NE, while a strategy with a high degree of being a symmetric NE doesn't necessarily have a high degree of being an ESS. This comparison result is congruous with the relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy symmetric NE. 
Discussion and Conclusion
A key concept in evolutionary game theory is that of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). It's defined by comparison between an incumbent's expected payoff and a mutant's expected payoff. When the payoffs are represented by fuzzy numbers, the comparison results become vague, so there is no way to determine whether a strategy is an ESS. Although many works on fuzzy games have been done, there has been no generalization of ESS into a fuzzy one, as far as is known to the author. Inspired by the recent work on fuzzy Nash equilibrium [6] , this paper gives a method to evaluate and compare ESS in fuzzy payoff games. In this method, the possibility that an incumbent's expected payoff is larger than a mutant's, is a function ofε (the invasion barrier). This function µ ij (ε) incorporates the satisfaction function [7] , which is also employed to compare two fuzzy payoffs in the fuzzification process of NE [6] . Besides µ ij (ε),ε is also an indicator of population stability, hence the degree of resistibility of one strategy against another, denoted as r ij , is defined by using fuzzy decision rule [8] on µ ij (ε) andε. The membership function µS(i) is defined as the minimum of r ij .
Since this paper has used a similar point of view to fuzzy ESS as Ref. [6] to the concept of fuzzy NE, the concept of fuzzy ESS has close relation to that of fuzzy NE. Just like crisp ESS can be considered as a refinement of crisp NE [4] , fuzzy ESS can be considered as a refinement of fuzzy NE. It is worthwhile to note that both fuzzy NE and fuzzy ESS assign membership to pure strategies. The formalizations of fuzzy NE and fuzzy ESS concerning mixed strategies are considerably complicated due to the continuity of mixed strategies.
It has been shown that fuzzy ESS can be used to deal with the vagueness in fuzzy payoff games. Other aspects of fuzzy ESS may be considered, e.g., what is the relation between crisp ESS and fuzzy ESS? What if the proposed approach is applied to crisp payoff games? When the payoffs are crisp numbers, the expected payoffs of incumbents and mutants are the following crisp numbers:
The satisfaction function for the comparison of crisp values k and l is defined as [7] SF
The following function represents the satisfaction degree to which Eq. (3) is satisfied: µ ij (ε) = inf ε∈(0,ε)
It's easy to verify that r ij is equal to the supremum of ε ij if ε ij exists, and is equal to 0.5 if E ij I (ε) = E ij M (ε) for every ε ∈ (0, 1), and is equal to 0 in other cases. For instance, the Stag Hunt game describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. Two hunters go out on a hunt. Each can choose to hunt a stag or a hare (represented by strategies G and H respectively). A hunter who hunts hare obtains a payoff of h > 0. A hunter who hunts stag obtains a payoff of g > h if the other hunter also hunts stag, and obtains a payoff of 0 otherwise. Formally, $(H, H) = $(H, G) = h, $(G, G) = g, $(G, H) = 0. According to the definition of crisp ESS, both G and H are ESS. By contrast, the fuzzy ESS set for Stag Hunt is
which gives a ranking of these two strategies. When h/g is small and µS(G) > µS(H), the hunters tend to cooperate to hunt stag. When h/g becomes larger and µS(H) > µS(G), the hunters tend to hunt hare to avoid the risk of being betrayed. In general, the membership function of a fuzzy ESS set for strategy s i is reduced to the minimum of the invasion barriers of s i against all s j (j = i).
In this way the idea of fuzzy ESS can be considered as a natural extension of the crisp ESS.
